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 The traditional power gird is altering dramatically to a smart power grid with 
the escalating development of information and communication technology 
(ICT). Among thousands of electronic devices connected to the grid through 
communication network, smart meter (SM) is the core networking device. 
The consolidation of ICT to the electronic devices centered on SM open 
loophole for the adversaries to launch cyber-attack. Therefore, for protecting 
the network from the adversaries it is required to design lightweight security 
mechanism for SM, as conventional cryptography schemes poses extensive 
computational cost, processing delay and overhead which is not suitable to 
be used in SM. In this paper, we have proposed a security mechanism 
consolidating elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Salsa20 stream cipher 
algorithm to ensure security of the network as well as addressing the problem 
of energy efficiency and lightweight security solution. We have numerically 
analyzed the performance of our proposed scheme in case of energy 
efficiency and processing time which reveals that the suggested mechanism 
is suitable to be used in SM as it consumes less power and requires less 
processing time to encrypt or decrypt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Smart grid (SG) is revolutionizing the conventional power infrastructure by enhancing reliability, 
efficiency and sustainability as well as offers real time energy consumption, ensures power flow, reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions [1, 2]. It is envisioned as the next generation power system that integrates 
information and communication network with the traditional power infrastructure. This networking facility 
enables the utility providers to deliver and distribute the power to the consumers according to their 
requirements. They can monitor and control the power consumption, usage and electricity bill through 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) which is the central networking infrastructure of SG. Smart meter 
(SM) is the core networking device of AMI which establishes full duplex communication link among  
the consumers and the service providers. Through this duplex link the SM sends energy consumption report 
to the utility providers from the smart electrical appliances and retrieves electricity bill for the consumers. 
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This heavy dependability on communication network makes the power grid vulnerable to the adversaries. 
The adversary can intrude the network and launch various cyber attacks to disrupt the normal operation of  
the power grid through SM as SM is the central networking device between the home area network (HAN) 
and neighborhood area network (NAN). 
Cyber attacks can be classified as insider attack and outsider attack [3]. In outsider attack,  
an adversary can attack the network without notifying the network administrator. The adversary can alter  
the data sent by the smart meter or manipulate the energy related data. Also, power outage can occur due to 
cyber attacks which can lead to hazardous situation in the network. Therefore, for protecting the network 
from attackers and ensuring privacy of the users, it is important to design security mechanisms that are 
compatible with the power infrastructure. The critical infrastructure of power grid imposes challenges to 
design and implement security mechanism to prevent any kind of cyber attacks and user privacy from  
the attackers. The SM is a resource constraint electronic device that requires light weight and resource 
efficient security mechanism to secure the communication among various devices. However,  
the conventional cryptography mechanisms are not resource efficient and suitable to use in SM security as 
these mechanism consumes extra power, requires high processing time and introduces overhead. Recently, 
various types of schemes have been proposed in the literature focusing resource efficiency of the SM.  
A lightweight authentication mechanism has been proposed in [4] named LiSA which incorporates 
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and ensures mutual authentication, anonymity, reply attack prevention and 
it takes less execution time. In [5] the authors have mentioned that as a resource constrained device  
the smart meter needs lightweight cryptography mechanism for securing the network. The authors have 
proposed physically unclonable function (PUF) based lightweight security solution. In [6] an authentication 
scheme has been proposed based on one-time password scheme to ensure mutual authentication between SM 
and the servers of the SG. The authors in [7] have proposed a sign-cryption mechanism for the security of 
SM which reduces maintenance cost of traditional key management infrastructure. PKI based physical layer 
assist mutual authentication (PLAMA) mechanism has been proposed in [8] for two-way communication in 
smart meter which is lightweight and provides faster authentication process. The authors in [9] have proposed 
an efficient message authentication scheme with non-repudiation service which also ensures low power 
consumption, but they did not prove power consumption issue clearly. In [10] the authors have proposed  
a novel authentication scheme based on ring oscillator physically unclonable functions for AMI network.  
The authentication mechanism ensures security for the communication between SM and utility company. It is 
secured, storage efficient and low latency. PUF and CSI based encryption mechanism has been proposed  
in [11] to ensure authentication and integrity of the network. Electricity forecasting based security and 
privacy scheme has been proposed in [12] which declines the overhead introduced by communication and 
computation. The authors in [13] has proposed a low overhead authentication mechanism to ensure security 
between SM and utility company. A framework based on anonymization has been proposed in [14] to 
enhance the security of the SG. Public key-based approach has been demonstrated in [15] which ensures 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation but public key based schemes are not energy 
efficient. To establish secure communication between consumers and substations, the authors in [16] 
proposed an ECC based authentication scheme but it is unable to ensure forward secrecy [17]. Shared secret 
key and random number based lightweight cryptography mechanism has been proposed in [18] for 
communication between supervisory node and control node. PUF and one way hash function based 
cryptography has been introduced to establish security among SM and service provider [19].  
In this paper, we propose to use a lightweight energy efficient cryptography scheme named  
Salsa20 [20] for securing the SM network. Salsa20 is based on ARX (addition, rotation and XOR). In 
conjunction with Salsa20, we suggest to use elliptic curve based authentication scheme before any data 
exchange takes place using Salsa20. Section 2 discusses the SM network. In section 2 we discuss our 
proposed solution. In section 4 we analyze the proposed scheme numerically and section 5 concludes  
the paper. 
 
 
2. SMART METER NETWORK 
Smart meter network covers HAN, building area network (BAN) and NAN, transmission, 
distribution, service provider, market and operation management according to the NIST [21-23]. Figure 1 
demonstrates the HAN network. HAN is a network inside the home utilized to monitor, record and collect 
energy usage data from the electrical appliances connected to the network. The smart energy devices 
connected wirelessly with the SM sends energy consumption data of the electrical appliances. The utility 
company can collect the energy consumption data through the SM using these energy devices as well as  
the home owners can also monitor their energy consumption data at the SM. However, the wireless 
connectivity is vulnerable to cyber attacks that can cause major damage to the network. Therefore, it is a vital 
requirement to secure this network to protect the power grid form the adversaries. 
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Figure 1. Architecture of smart meter network 
 
 
3. PROPOSED METHOD 
3.1. Initialization phase 
SM and another connected device with SM will perform initial authentication using elliptic curve 
cryptography [24]. For encryption and decryption based on elliptic curve, each electrical device say 𝑖, 
chooses a generator point 𝑔 in 𝐸𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏), a private key 𝑛𝑖 such that 𝑛𝑖 < 𝑛 where 𝑛 is the smallest positive 
integer number for which 𝑛 × 𝑔 =⨷. Then the chosen generator point with the elliptic curve 𝐸𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏) are 
made publicly available by the electrical node. After that the electrical device 𝑖 computes its public key as 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑔 and then shares with the SM. To encrypt a message for SM say 𝑗, device 𝑖 computes cipher text 
pair by choosing a random number lets say 𝑘 as, 
 
CM = (kg, PM + kPj)   
 
where, 𝑃𝑀 is the point in which the message 𝑀 has been encoded following a suitable encoding process. To 
decrypt the message sensor node 𝑗 performs following operation: 
 
PM + kPj − nj(kg)  
 
= PM + k(njg) − nj(kg)  
 
= 𝑃𝑀  
 
That is node 𝑗 first multiplies the first point of the cipher text with its private key and subtracts from 
the second point. A malicious node needs to know the random number 𝑘 for decrypting the message and it is 
difficult to compute 𝑘𝑔 given 𝑔. Utilizing elliptic curve cryptography, the SM and the other smart devices 
will share their identity for authentication purpose. After completing authentication, the SM will exchange 
data with other devices using low powered cryptography called Salsa20. 
 
3.2. Data exchange phase 
In this section we discuss the data exchange between SM and the connected appliances. We have 
suggested to use Salsa20 [20] stream cipher as the encryption mechanism as it is a lightweight security 
mechanism for exchanging meter read in and other information. Another version of Salsa20 is ChaCha20. In 
another work we have proposed ChaCha20 as the encryption and decryption mechanism. Here, we have 
compared ChaCha20 and Salsa20 in the performance evaluation section. Salsa20 takes input of 16 words and 
outputs 16 words. Like other cryptography algorithms Salsa20 also has a round function which operated 
repeatedly on some data to get the result. Salsa20’s round function itself consists of 4 quarter round function. 
The quarter round functions can be stated as, 
 
𝑏⩘ = (𝑎 + 𝑑) <<< 7  
 
𝑐⩘ = (𝑏 + 𝑎) <<< 9  
 
𝑑⩘ = (𝑐 + 𝑏) <<< 13  
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𝑎⩘ = (𝑑 + 𝑐) <<< 18  
 
where, a, b, c, d are initial state words of 32 bits in length. Initial state matrix is 16 words, but the quarter 
round function operates on 4 32-bit words at a time. The initial state matrix can be defined as shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Initial matrix of Salsa20 
 
 
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section discusses the performance of the suggested method for SM. The performance 
evaluation through numerical analysis done here are expected to apply to SM and electrical appliances as 
well. We have numerically analyzed the performance of the suggested method in terms of energy 
consumption and processing time. As these two parameters can be used to analyze whether a scheme is 
lightweight or not, therefore we have examined to analyze in case of energy utilization and processing time. 
In the Table 1 demonstrates the parameters considered for numerical analysis. 
 
 
Table 1. Numerial Parameters 
Procssor Intel Core 2 Duo 
Processors operating voltage 0.8500V to 1.5V 
Processors operating frequency 2.13 GHz(Cycles/Second) 
Current 20.67 Amp 
Current/Cycle 9.70 Amp 
Salsa20 Speed  3.90 Cycles/Byte 
ChaCha20 speed 3.95 Cycles/Byte 
 
 
Energy consumption: this evaluation parameter denotes computational energy meaning the amount 
of energy consumed by a cryptography scheme when it operates encryption or decryption operation, 
transmission energy meaning the energy required to transmit packets to a receiving node, reception energy 
meaning the amount of energy needed to receive a packet. it is important to analyze energy efficiency as 
most of the wireless devices (specially SM) are battery powered and suffers from battery power limitation. 
Thus, designing energy efficient security scheme will enhance the lifetime of the devices. To evaluate energy 
consumption of our proposed scheme and ChaCha20, we have utilized the following equation [25]: 
 
𝐸 =
𝐶𝐶/𝐵
𝐶𝐶/𝑆
 𝐼 𝑉  
 
where, CC/ B denotes clock cycles required per byte for encryption and decryption. CC/S denotes clock cycle 
requires per second by the processor. I is the current and V is the operating voltage. Figure 3 demonstrates 
the comparison of energy consumption of Salsa20 and ChaCha20 which reveals that Salsa20 takes less power 
than ChaCha20 and makes the proposed scheme lightweight to be used in SM, whereas  
the other cryptography schemes like AES, DES requires lots of computational power which is not suitable for 
lightweight electronic device. Table 2 shows the energy consumption values for two schemes named Salsa20 
and ChaCha20. 
Processing time: It defines the time required for the processor to perform encryption or decryption 
of a size of data. The cryptography scheme which takes less processing time will perform fast than  
the cryptography scheme which requires large processing time. Also, fast processing time will reduce end to 
end delay. The required time can be calculated as, 
 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
  
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 =
𝐶𝐶/𝑆
𝐶𝐶/𝐵
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where, speed denotes bytes per second or throughput. Figure 4 demonstrates the processing time required by 
ChaCha20 and Salsa20 which clearly reveals that Salsa20 takes less processing time which makes the 
processing of data faster. Table 3 shows the processing time comparison of Salsa20 and ChaCha20. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of computational energy consumption of Salsa20 and ChaCha20 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of processing time of Salsa20 and ChaCha20 
 
 
Table 2. Computational energy consumption  
of two schemes 
File Size 
Salsa20 
enrgy consumption(mJ) 
ChaCha20 
energy consumption(mJ) 
1000 1.06 × 10−9 1.91 × 10−9 
2000 2.13 × 10−9 3.83 × 10−9 
3000 3.21 × 10−9 5.39 × 10−9 
4000 4.37 × 10−9 7.05 × 10−9 
5000 5.41 × 10−9 9.00 × 10−9 
 
Table 3. Processing time comparison  
of two schemes 
File Size 
Salsa20 
Processing time (ms) 
ChaCha20 
Processing time (ms) 
1000 0.91 0.93 
2000 17.98 18.67 
3000 29.87 39.02 
4000 51.01 68.37 
5000 80.48 101.98 
 
 
 
In this section we have analyzed the proposed scheme in case of energy utilization and processing 
time. Our purpose was to ensure a lightweight security scheme for a low powered electronic device SM.  
The numerical analysis of energy consumption and processing time clearly shows that the suggested scheme 
Salsa20 performs better and Salsa20 requires less processing time and computational energy which makes it 
lightweight. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have addressed the problem that the SM is a resource constrained electronic device 
which requires lightweight security mechanism for securing the network but most of the proposed protocols 
or methods can not satisfy the requirements needed to be lightweight as they consume huge processing power 
and takes huge processing time to complete its operation. Therefore, we have suggested to use ARX based 
simple lightweight stream cipher algorithm named Salsa20 to be used in SM for securing the power grid. 
Along with Salsa20, we have also proposed ECC based authentication before exchanging any data. ECC is 
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also energy efficient and it is a public key-based approach. Thus, before exchanging information using 
Salsa20, the SM authenticates with the legitimate device. We have numerically analyzed the performance in 
case of energy utilization and processing time. Figures 3 and 4 reveals that our suggested mechanism 
consumes very less energy and takes very less processing time which makes it suitable to be used in SM. In 
future, we will analyze the suggested security scheme in terms of its security performance. 
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